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0. Introduction
In current (dynam ic) theories of semantics, such as Groenendijk and S tokhof’s 
(1991) Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL), anaphoric expressions are trea ted  as 
bound variables. The m ain drawback of this approach is th a t it relegates the 
way in which anaphor/antecedent relations are determ ined to some external (and 
notoriously unspecified) module. For example, consider:
(1) Joe has a cat. It is black.
l3 r (c a t( r )  A owns(y, x )) A b lack (r)’
The DPL form ula in the above translation is in terpreted  as if the  variable x  in 
black(z) was bound by the existential quantifier in the first conjunct. However, 
why x ra ther than  any o ther variable appears in the translation  of the second 
sentence is outside the scope of the theory.
No doubt, anaphoric reference has certain aspects which, in all probability, 
cannot be p u t in semantic term s. Those aspects may be governed by genuinely 
form al (e.g., syntactic) properties of the utterances in which the anaphors appear, 
and  there is not much hope th a t we can explain them  w ithin sem antics.1 B ut the 
fact th a t some properties of anaphoric binding fall outside the scope of semantics 
does not justify  a treatm ent in which anaphor/antecedent relations are determ ined 
by mechanisms entirely independent from semantics, by pure magic, as it were. In 
particular, an  anaphor always requires tha t there be exactly one salient individual
1 For example, the gender agreement between the anaphor and  its antecedent 
often has no semantic counterpart, because gram m atical gender is a purely 
formal feature in m any languages. The o ther well-known case when an a­
phoric relations depend on form al factors is related to the distinction between 
anaphoric vs. reflexive pronouns in languages like English:
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in  the  context th a t can  serve as its antecedent, at least among the candidates not 
excluded by form al factors (such as gender and syntactic structure). Since this is 
a  fact about the semantics of anaphors, it should be captured by sem antics. On 
the  o th er hand, anaphors lexically carry some descriptive content which constrains 
the  range of their possible antecedents, and those constraints are also semantic.
In  w hat follows, we will develop a dynamic theory  of anaphors which could 
account for both  the  uniqueness requirem ent and the  descriptive content of ana­
phors, as an a lternative  to the bound-variable view. O ur treatm ent is an a ttem p t 
to  form ally develop, in  a  dynamic framework, ideas on anaphoric binding th a t 
were proposed by various researchers as early as Cooper (1979) and Evans (1980), 
and  which have been inform ally proposed in dynamic semantics by K álm án (1995) 
and  Groenendijk et a1. (1995).
Given the fact th a t  the view of inform ation states as sets of assignm ent func­
tions in D PL is m otivated  by the bound-variable view of anaphors th a t we are 
criticizing, we will have to  develop a different concept of inform ation s ta tes  in the 
first place (Section 1.1). If we adopt this new concept, we can store w hat entities 
have been introduced in  the discourse, w ithout knowing w hat variables have been 
used for introducing them . There is no reason why we should keep track  of dis­
course referents by a rb itra ry  nam es (i.e., variables in the domains of assignm ent 
functions) if we do no t want to use those nam es to refer to them  la te r on. Then,
(2) Joe likes him .
*‘Joe likes him self’
(3) Joe reminded Peter of him.
*‘Joe rem inded Peter of him self’
In these sentences, th e  anaphoric pronoun him may not be co-referential with 
any o ther noun ph rase  in the sentence. The fact th a t co-reference has to be 
expressed by a reflexive pronoun in these syntactic configurations probably 
cannot be expressed or explained in semantic term s. Finally, the  syntactic 
and  rhetorical s tru c tu re  of an u tterance  sometimes biasses anaphoric relations 
w ith o u t fully determ ining them:
(4) Whenever Joe meets Peter, he greets him.
(5) Joe didn’t recognize Peter, because he had shaved his beard.
T he preferred reading  of (4) is when the gram m atical role of each anaphor 
m atches th a t of its  antecedent. In (5), on the o ther hand, the  best way 
of ensuring the coherence of the discourse is to take he to be co-referential 
w ith  Peter ra ther th a n  Joe, because this is the sim plest way of establishing 
the  desired rhetorical relation between the two clauses. For details on this 
m echanism  see Polanyi (1988) and Priist (1992).
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in Section 1.2.1, we define a first-order language interpreted dynam ically in which 
quantification over the discourse universe can be expressed in an elegant way. This 
is necessary because the  uniqueness of the antecedents of anaphors m ust be sa t­
isfied in the discourse universe ra ther than  the entire model. A fter exam ining 
certain logical properties of the resulting system (Section 1.2.2), we ‘partia lize’ 
th a t language to account for presuppositions (Section 1.2.3). The reason for this 
is th a t the requirem ents th a t anaphors impose on their antecedent are of a  pre- 
suppositional character. We also examine the most essential logical properties of 
the system introduced. Finally, in Section 2, we explain the consequences of our 
treatm ent for various phenom ena related to anaphors, such as donkey sentences 
and the interaction of anaphors w ith modal operators.
1. Dynam ic U pdate Predicate Logic
Possible alternatives to  the bound-variable approach to anaphors m ust trea t an a ­
phors as quantificational. Consider:
(1) Joe has a cat. It is black.
Under the quantificational view, the anaphoric pronoun it in the above piece of 
discourse m ust be in terpreted  as the condensed form of a definite description such 
as ‘the non-hum an individual’, which involves a quantifier (‘there is exactly one 
non-hum an individual’) th a t is possibly presuppositional. We will call this type of 
quantification anaphoric quantification.
The interesting fact about expressions of anaphoric quantification is th a t they  
constitute unstable propositions in the sense of Veltman (1981). T h a t is, for in ­
stance, ‘there is exactly one non-hum an individual’ may be true in the context in 
which (1) is u ttered , bu t false in a subsequent context, in which m ore th an  one 
non-hum an individual has been introduced. The only dynamic sem antic theory  in 
which such unstable propositions exist is Veltman’s (1981, 1990) Update Seman­
tics. U pdate Semantics, however, uses a propositional logic, so it cannot express 
quantification over individuals. The only possible source of instability  in V eltm an 
(1990) is the possibility operator. Formulae of the form ‘<)<p’ (read  as ‘m ight cp’, 
and in terpreted  in an epistemic m anner) may be true in an inform ation s ta te  th a t 
does not exclude the  tru th  of </?, b u t can be falsified by subsequent inform ation. 
We will introduce another type of unstable propositions, namely, those involving 
anaphoric quantification. For example, the anaphoric version of the quantifier 
‘there is exactly one’ quantifies over the domain of entities already in troduced  in 
a context. Thus, it gives rise to non-upward-entailing quantification, which m ay 
become false from true  as we enlarge the universe of discourse.
The instability  of anaphoric quantification will manifest itself in the properties 
of the function th a t assigns a truth value to every formula and inform ation sta te .
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For example, we want to  say tha t ‘there is exactly one non-hum an indiv idual’ is 
tru e  in an inform ation s ta te  if and only if the existence of exactly one non-hum an 
individual can be taken for granted in the  given inform ation state. Thus, a form ula 
m ay be true  in an inform ation state  w ithout being tru e  in the actual world, even 
if the  inform ation s ta te  is true  to the world. On the o ther hand, if ‘there  is exactly 
one non-hum an ind iv idual’ is true in a tru th fu l inform ation state  and, moreover, in 
all its  extensions as well (i.e., in the more inform ative inform ation sta tes th a t may 
arise from it), then  th is proposition m ust indeed be tru e  in the world. Obviously, 
th e  m eaning of an anaphor like it does not entail th a t the world contains ju s t one 
non-hum an individual.
The system  th a t we will use in the following is designed to be the  simplest 
one th a t can express the  above concepts (including V eltm an’s (1990) concept of 
‘u p d a tin g ’). It is called Dynamic Update Predicate Logic (DUPLO for short), to 
express its close kinship to  both  U pdate Semantics and  DPL. In the  rest of this 
section we first explain the  concept of an inform ation s ta te  in DUPLO. Then we 
describe the sem antics of DUPLO formulae, which are first-order form ulae w ith a 
possibility opera to r ‘<0>’ sim ilar to V eltm an’s (1990) and  a  presupposition operato r 
‘A ’ sim ilar to  Beaver’s (1992).
1.1. Inform ation S tates in D U PL O
As can be expected from  the above, inform ation sta tes in DUPLO do not store 
possible values of variables (assignments are param eters of the sem antic-value 
functions as in classical, s tatic  logic), b u t they do keep track of w hat entities 
have been m entioned and  w hat has been learnt about them . An inform ation sta te  
in  D U PLO  consists of possibilities each of which carries inform ation abou t w hat 
th e  world may be like. B ut possibilities are not complete descriptions of the  world, 
th ey  are partia l in the sense th a t they express th a t certain  facts are known to be 
tru e  about some entities the  existence of which is suggested by previous discourse, 
b u t n o t every fact is known about them .2
T he way in which we will represent possibilities, i.e., p artia l inform ation about 
the  world, is the  following. Each possibility contains a  num ber of alternatives, some 
of th em  more com plete th a n  the others, possibly w ith complete possible worlds 
a t one end of the scale. These alternatives will be called model fragments. A 
m odel fragm ent is exactly like a (first-order) model, except th a t its universe may 
be em pty. It is like a  subset of the universe of the m odel, plus an in te rp re ta tion  
function  th a t is restric ted  to th a t universe.
2 In  what follows, we will assume th a t the in terp re ta tion  functions are first- 
order, i.e., they ju s t assign a set of n-tuples to each n-ary  predicate constant. 
Extending inform ation states to higher-order in terpre ta tion  functions would 
raise no problem  at all.
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(6) Definition: Model fragments
A model fragment /  is an ordered pair (A//, J / )  such th a t U/ ,  the universe 
of / ,  is a set of individuals (taken from a countable set U containing all 
individuals), and the interpretation function of / ,  X/ ,  which assigns a set 
of n-tuples of individuals in V{UJ) to every n-ary predicate constant. We 
will refer to the entire set of model fragments satisfying these constraints 
as J-.
We also need the concept of the informativity of model fragm ents:
(7) Definition: Informativity of model fragments
A model fragment =  (T/y^Jy,) is at least as informative as the model 
fragm ent f 2 =  (W/2,X /a) (written: f x C f 2) iff
(i) Uh  CW /n  and
(ii) for every predicate constant P , Xf2(P) C Xfl (P).
Every possibility p in an inform ation state n is a set of m odel fragm ents. We 
will talk about the core of p, which is the set of its least inform ative elements:
(8) Definition: Core of a possibility
If P C T  is a possibility, then the core of p (written: C(p)) is
C ( p )  =  { / e p :  A  ( /  E  / ' = ► / '  =  / ) } •
p e p
T he universes of the core elements of a possibility represent po ten tia l discourse 
universes. W hen updating an information state  in such a way th a t a  new in­
dividual is m entioned in the discourse, the cardinality of every core element of 
every possibility will increase by one. We will refer to this process informally as 
‘extending the discourse universe’.
We will also need the set of model fragments in a possibility p th a t are at 
least as inform ative as a certain model fragment /  £ p:
(9) Definition: The cloak of a model fragment
If p is a possibility in an information state, and /  £ p is a model fragm ent, 
then  the cloak of /  in p (w ritten  j,pf )  is
I p f  = < ! . ( { / 'e p :  / ' £ / } .
Finally, we will use the concept of the set of the least informative extensions 
of a possibility p satisfying d>:
M AXp,c , ( * )  =def {p1 C p: $  & / \  ( W / p " ] k p '  c  p") =* p" =  p)
p " Cp
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where $\p ' /p"] is the  sam e as <f>, w ith the free occurrences of p' su b stitu ted  for by
p".
The possibilities in an  inform ation s ta te  need not be com patible w ith each 
other; the  m odel fragm ents w ithin a possibility need not, either. T h a t is, they need 
n o t be fragm ents of the sam e model, so to say. The m ost inform ative elem ents of a 
possibility can be com plete models, namely, those th a t could be models of the real 
w orld given the inform ation represented by the inform ation state. This need not 
originate from  the discourse itself; certain possible worlds can be excluded already 
a t the ou tset, in the beginning of a conversation, so th a t the  single possibility th a t 
we s ta rt the  conversation w ith need not contain absolutely all possible models. 
For exam ple, it may be the  case tha t ‘all birds fly’ is tru e  in all most inform ative 
m odel fragm ents in the in itia l possibility, although no b ird  whatsoever is present 
in  the universes of the core elements. We will not dwell upon the question w hat 
ty p e  of inform ation may be present in this form, nor how it gets there. We simply 
will allow any set of possibilities to act as an inform ation state:
(10) Definition: Information states
The set IT of information states is V(V(J-)).
1.2. T he Sem antics o f DUPLO
T h e  language of DUPLO is a first-order language w ith equality, a m odal operator 
‘O ’, and a presupposition opera to r ‘A ’.3 We will proceed in two steps for the sake 
of expository convenience. We will first define a version of DUPLO w ith  to ta l 
functions (w ithout the A  operator), then we will in troduce the A  opera to r and, 
a t  the  same tim e, partia l semantic-value functions.
1.2 .1 . T h e Total V ersion of D U PL O
W e define two im portan t concepts in the following. The first concept is the  truth 
of a  form ula in an inform ation state  (under an assignm ent). The tru th  function 
is a  three-valued function, because we want to  make a distinction between ‘known 
to  be tru e ’ ( tru th  value 1), ‘known to be false’ ( tru th  value 0) and ‘not known to 
be  e ither tru e  or false’ ( tru th  value | ) .  The second central concept is the  result of 
updating an inform ation s ta te  w ith (the inform ation content of) a form ula (under 
an  assignm ent). The tru th  function and the update  function are defined using 
sim ultaneous recursion.
3 For the sake of simplicity, we will not introduce functors into the  language. 
In particu lar, we exclude individual constants. We decided to proceed in this 
way to avoid com plications th a t have no relevance for the  topic of th is paper. 
We believe the system  to  be proposed could easily be enriched w ith functors.
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(11) Definition: DUPLO’s language (total version)
The to ta l version of DU PLO ’s language is an ordered quadruple
C' =def (LC,Var, Con, Form).
The set LC of logical constants, the set Var of individual variables and the  
set Con of non-logical constants are pairwise disjunct.
LC =dei { 3 ,- \ 0 , - s  >,(,)};
Var =def {Xi}i<u>;
Con =def t^J C o n ^ ;
l<n<u>
Con(n) —def { P /n))i< W.
The set Form of formulae is defined as the smallest set satisfying the clauses 
of the definitions of atomic formulae and of the truth-value function below.
We will use the notation | • \g for the first-order semantic-value function for 
the  atomic formulae of DUPLO. This function yields a classical tru th  value (1 or 
0) for every form ula and model fragment.
(12) Definition: Atomic formulae and their first-order truth values
If g is an assignment function and /  is a model fragment, then the first-order 
semantic-value function | • \f is defined in a standard  way, as follows:
(i) If . . . , x„ £ Var and P  £ Con^n\  then ‘P ( x j , . . . ,  x n)’ £ Form is an 
atomic formula of DUPLO.
| P ( x i ,  . . . , £ „ ) | j  dei
if ( g ( x i ) , . . . , g ( x n)) £ J / ( P ) ;  
otherwise.
(Ü ) If X i,X 2 € Var, then ‘(xi =  X2)’ 
PLO.
I ( * l  =  X 2 ) \ I  = d e i
£ Form is an atomic formula of DU-
r i  if2 (x i)  =  g(x2y,
1 0 otherwise.
The tru th  value of a formula ip in an inform ation sta te  7r (under an assignm ent 
g) will be w ritten  as [<p] (^7r) (the partial version of this function will be [-]s ). T he 
result of updating  an inform ation state  ir w ith a formula ip (under an assignm ent 
g) is w ritten as [ ^ ^ ( tt) (the partial version being I^ J s i71'))- We will now define 
b o th  the to ta l tru th  function and the total update  function. The definition of the  
tru th  function also contains the definition of non-atom ic formulae of DUPLO. We 
will rely on the concept of modified assignments, defined in the usual way:
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(13) Definition: Modified assignment
If g is an assignm ent function in x  £ Var and u £ U, then  g[x:u],
the  assignment modified in x  for u, is defined as follows:
»[*:«](») = w { “(y) otherwise
for every y £ Var.
(14) Definition: Total truth function
T he truth value of a formula p> in an inform ation s ta te  7r under the as­
signm ent g in the  to ta l version of DUPLO, w ritten  ‘[<^ ]j (tt) \  is defined as 
follows:
i. If ip is an atom ic formula, then
( i  if ApgTr A /gp M g = i;
M g(*) =def < 0 if Apg* A /gp = 0; 
t \  otherwise.
T h a t is, for an atom ic form ula to be true  (false) in an inform ation s ta te , it has 
to  be true  (false) in every model fragm ent of every possibility. The tru th  and 
falsity of atom ic form ulae are stable because, as we will see la ter on, u p d a tin g  an 
inform ation s ta te  can a t m ost eliminate m odel fragm ents (see (20)).
ii. If a: £ Var and <p £ Form, then ‘Bxip’ £ Form.
( 1 ^  ApgTT A/gC(p) Vug«; =
\ ^xp \g(n)  =def \ 0 if ApgTT A/gC(p) AugiV/ ({ '!'?/}) =
 ^ f  otherwise.
For an  existential form ula of the form 3x<p to  be true in an inform ation s ta te , each 
core elem ent of each possibility must contain a t least one individual for which the 
body  ( (p) is tru e  in the cloak of the core elem ent. On the o ther hand, we can only 
take it for granted  th a t it is false if no core elem ent of any possibility contains such 
individuals. There is uncerta in ty  in the rem aining cases. An existential form ula is 
T-unstable (it may become false from true) ju s t in case its body is; it is F-unstable 
(it m ay becom e true from  false) under norm al circum stances, because extending 
th e  discourse universe m ay introduce entities for which <p holds.
iii. If ip £ Form, th en  ‘~ v ’ £ Form.
M K * )  =def 1 -  [<p]g(ir).
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This is trivial. Note th a t ->p is T-unstable just in case ip is F-unstable, and it is 
F-unstable just in case ip is T-unstable.
iv. If ip, ip £ Form, then \ p  A ip)' £ Form.
As can be seen, the tru th  and the falsity of conjunction are defined in an asym ­
m etric way. The tru th  of a conjunction is dynamic: If the first conjunct introduces 
some entity, then the second conjunct may pick it up. On the o ther hand, if the  
first conjunct is T-unstable, then it need not be true in 7r provided the second 
conjunct falsifies it. Take, e.g., ()p  A ->p: its tru th  in n only requires for -up to  
hold in 7r. So the intuition behind this definition is th a t a form ula m ust be tru e  
in an information state th a t could have been produced by updating  another infor­
m ation state  w ith it. On the other hand, our impression is th a t defining falsity in 
a  dynamic way is both technically impossible and unnecessary.
v. If p,ip  £ Form, then \ p  —> t/>)’ £ Form.
using the other connectives, bu t we may need it for translating  natural-language
This is almost like the usual in terpretation of (}p in U pdate Semantics, except
[(¥> -» V’)]i(7r) =def W g(l<p]g(n))-
The question arises why we need a separate connective for m aterial im plication 
instead of using the standard  definition i~'(p A —'-0)’. As we have seen, A
_lV,)]g(7r) =  1’ expresses th a t either ip is false or ip is true in n. ‘[</? —> xp]g(n) =  1’, 
on the other hand, means th a t neither -up nor ip need to be true  in 7r, bu t updating  
7T w ith ip yields an inform ation state  in which tp is true. This cannot be expressed
sentences which express a conditional relation between two propositions the tru th  
values of which need not be known, as we will see later on.
vi. If tp £ Form, then ‘^ p '  £ Form.
if A
if A ,e ,r K « p } )  =  0;
otherwise.
th a t we stipulate th a t it m ust be possible to update every possibility separately 
(‘distributively’) w ith p  in order for §ip to be true.
The update  function is defined in such a way th a t updating  7r w ith p  yields 
an inform ation state  th a t is minimally more informative than  n and makes p  true .
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(15) Total update function
If 7r is an inform ation state, p  is a form ula and g is an assignm ent function, 
th e n  the to ta l version of the resu lt of updating 7r w ith p  under g , w ritten  
‘VpYgi11)'i *s defined as
M I M  =d.t  U  m a x , . £ p( M ; ( { p '})  =  l) .
p £ n
It is easy to  see th a t ip is indeed true  in (7r)- The reason is th a t, since every 
clause in th e  tru th  function  is defined possibility by possibility,
M ^ l )  =  M 'g M  => W]'g{^\ U 7T2) =  [<p]'g{n)
for any 7r1,7r2 and <p. O n the other hand , for the same reason, (tt) is indeed 
the  least inform ative extension of 7r which has this property.
Let us now review each type of form ulae and elaborate on their u p d a te  effects.
(16) Facts about the total update function
i. If p  is an atom ic form ula, then
Ivl'gi*) = U  {{/ e P: M Í = 1»-
p£n
If p  is an  atomic formula, then the least informative extension of 7r in which p  
is true  can be produced by leaving out every model fragm ent from every possibility 
in  which p  is false.
= u «/ e p: v (/ e /' & v = 1).
7T / ' € p  U^ Uj ,
By the above argum ent, th is  is indeed the  least inform ative extension of 7r which 
makes 3x p  true . W hen u pdating  an inform ation sta te  w ith  3xc^, we guarantee 
th a t  every core element of every possibility will contain a t least one individual 
th a t  satisfies p , but not m ore than absolutely necessary. If the input inform ation 
s ta te  did n o t contain individuals satisfying p, then every possible value of x  will be 
present in som e fragm ent of every possibility in the o u tp u t state. As a  result, no 
new  possibilities arise, b u t m any new core elements do which only differ in w hat 
individual plays the role of ‘ad, so to say.
1.2.1. The Total Version of DUPLO 11
iii.
= U  MAx„.cP(M i({p'})= o).
p £ n
This is ju s t the instantiation of the definition in (15) for negative formulae.
iv.
As usual in dynamic semantics, conjunction corresponds to function com position. 
It is easy to  prove th a t this is indeed the least informative extension of 7r in which 
iip A t/d is true.
Ip -* = U  MAXp'Cp([V,]i(M i({p'))) =  !)•
Just like disjunction (the negation of a conjunction), conditionals are also able to  
m ultiply possibilities when we update an information state  with them .
[Ov>rs (ir) = { p e n :  M 's ({p}) #  0}.
Unlike in U pdate Semantics, modal formulae do have an updating effect. As we 
will see shortly, this is ju st a technical difference.
The concept of entailment in DUPLO could be defined in the usual way:
1= V’ ^  W g ilp i  A . . .  A ¥>n]J(ír)) =  1
for all 7T and  g. This would probably do the job, bu t we can provide a  stronger 
definition, and  one th a t is closer to the classical concept of entailm ent:
(17) Definition: Entailment in DUPLO
A sequence of formulae p>\, . . . ,  <pn entails a formula xp ,ipn (=?/>) iff,
for all inform ation states n and assignments <7,
W g i* ) > W\ A . . .  A ¥n)'g{n)-
Note th a t, in DUPLO, entailm ent is trivially reflexive. In U pdate Sem antics, a 
formula like 0 V7 A ->ip does not entail itself. In th a t theory, Ov? A -xp would en tail 
itself if and only if, for any 7r, the result updating  n with O9? A ~'ip supported  
A -<ip (i.e., in our terminology, if A -><p was true in it). B ut Ov7 A ~xp has 
the  same update  effect as ~'<p, and updating n w ith ~'p yields an inform ation s ta te  
th a t does not support In DUPLO, however, we have the following fact:
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(18) Fact: Entailment is reflexive
ip \= ip for every <p>.
M oreover, entailm ent is also triv ially  transitive in DUPLO. In first-order ver­
sions of U pdate  Sem antics, a  formula like 3 x (P (x )) entails 3y (P (y )), and  the la tte r 
entails P (y ) , bu t 3x (P (x ))  does not en tail P (y). D UPLO does not have this ra th e r 
inconvenient feature.
(19) Fact: Entailment is transitive
p | = V ’ &V’ b x = > P l = X -
1.2.2. Som e P rop erties of D U PL O
In w hat follows, we exam ine certain general properties of DUPLO. In particular, 
we are in terested  in those features th a t distinguish it from  other dynam ic theories. 
However, we defer the discussion of differences related to anaphors to  Section 2.
The first property th a t  is usually relevant in the  assessment of a  dynamic 
sem antic theory  is eliminativity:
(20) Fact: Eliminativity
/V s[vds(jr) Vp'g?r-P — P •
T h a t is, th e  update  function  always yields an inform ation state  th a t is a t least 
as inform ative as its in p u t. Some version of elim inativity is usually satisfied by 
dynam ic theories, unless they  set out to  account for cases of belief revision.
We have m entioned earlier tha t the tru th  and falsity of certain D U PLO  for­
m ulae are no t stable:
(21) Fact: Instability
M s O )  =  1 & = *' b  [vYgi*') =  l;
M g (> ) =  o & M j O )  =  tt' b  W O  =  o.
T h a t is, the  tru th  and falsity  of a form ula <p are not preserved under arb itra ry  
updates. For example, f)V xP (x)  may be tru e  in n (namely, if every possibility in 
7T contains sub-possibilities in which V xP (x)  is true). U pdating n w ith  -iVxP(x) 
m ay yield a  non-em pty inform ation s ta te  n '. Obviously, <C>VxP(x) is no t true in 
the  resulting inform ation s ta te . On the o th er hand, because of the fact m entioned 
in (14iii), -><0>P  is F-unstable.
Since 3xip is F -unstable , universal quantification defined in the usual way will 
come out as T -unstable in DUPLO:
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(22) Fact: Truth of a universal formula
1. [Vx<^( 7r) =  1
2. [ - 3 x- v?]^(tt) =  1 [1, by def.J
3. [3x-< ^ (7 t) =  0 [2, (14in)]
4. A pen A feC(p) / \ueuf [“'^ [x ru ^ U p /} )  =  0 [3, (H ii)]
5. Apg7r A/eC(p) A u£Uj [<x]p[x: u] ( ^ [4, (14iii)j
As can be seen, the tru th  of Vx<yS involves universal quantification over individuals 
already introduced. So introducing new referents may alter its tru th  value.
On the other hand, the F-instability  of \/xip depends on the properties of 
(23) Fact: Falsity of a universal formula
1. [Vxp}'g(rr) =  0
2. [ -3 x- v ](,(tr) =  0 [1, by def.
3. [3x-^ ] 's(tt) =  1 [2, (14iii)]
4. Ap€7r A fec(p) V u&uf 1 13, (14ii)]
5. ApgTT A fec(p) MueUf M s[x:u](U p/}) =  0 [4, (14iii)]
If V xP(x) is false in an inform ation state, then it will remain false forever, be­
cause introducing new individuals may not change the tru th  of P  for the  referents 
introduced earlier. However, if VxB\yR (x ,y)  was false in an inform ation s ta te  
for 3x->3y R (x ,y )  is true  in it, then  introducing a new individual can make the 
universal formula true.
In contradistinction to D PL and similar theories, universal form ulae can also 
have updating effects in DUPLO.
(24) Fact: Update of universal formulae
1. [Vx<^(7r)
2. h 3 x - ^ ] '9(7r) [1, by def.
3. U i>€,M A X l,< c p ([3 x ^ ] '({ p '} )  =  0) [2, (16iii)]
4. UpgTT MAXp/Cp(A/eC(p') f\u£U, [_l(d]5[x:u]({J.p'/}) =  0) [3, (14Ü)]
5. Up^ TT ^^■■^■p'Cp(A/ec(p') l\ueUj [tr,]s[x:u]({J-p'/}) =  ■*■) [4, (14iii)]
This means tha t universal form ulae may introduce new individuals into the dis­
course universe. In particu lar, the updating  effect of a sentence like
(25) Every farmer has a donkey
consists in minimally trim m ing the input information state  so th a t every farm er 
in the o u tpu t state has a donkey.
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(26) Fact: Update of Vx(F(x )  —» 3yD(x,  y))
1. [V x (F (x )  -*• 3 y D ( x , y ) ) f g ( n )
2 . UpgTT M A X p#Cj> (A /6C(j>') A U&U,
[ F ( x ) - > 3 y D ( x , y ) } ' g[x:u]( { l p , f } )  =  l ) [1, (24)]
3 . Upgjr M A X p'C p(A /gc(j> ') A u g iq
[3yD (x,y)]'g[x.u]( lF(x)}g[x:u]( { l p' f })) =  1) [4, (14v)]
T h a t is, the  resulting inform ation  sta te  will contain as m any donkeys as there are 
individuals in the inform ation state  th a t are known to  be farmers. Furtherm ore, 
if  an  individual already p resen t in the discourse universe tu rns out to be a farm er 
la te r  on, his donkey will be introduced autom atically. (T he restriction to individ­
u a ls  already introduced stem s from the definition of V.) On the o ther hand, if we 
defined m ateria l im plication in  terms of negation and  conjunction, we would get 
a  different result.
(27) Fact: Update of \/x~>(F(x) A ~'3yD(x, y))
1. [V x -(F (x ) A -i3yD (x,y))]'g(n)
2. UpgTr M A X ,c p (A /€C( , )  l\ueu,
H F ( x )  A - 3 yD (x , y))}'g[x:u]( { lp. f } )  = 1) [1, (24)]
3. U ps* MAXP'C p(A /gc(p ') A ueUf
[F(x)]lg[tiu]a i P' f } )  = 0 V
[3yD (x,y)]'g[x:u]( { lp' f } )  = 1) (2, (14iii), (14iv)]
T h is  in terp re ta tion  has no t m uch to do w ith a  conditional. R ather, it says ‘every­
one (in the discourse universe) either is definitely not a  farm er or positively has 
a  donkey’. T h is is the a rgum ent th a t we m entioned w hen we defined a  separate 
connective for m aterial im plication.
Turning back to the tran sla tio n  in (26), the m inim al modification of the in­
fo rm ation  s ta te  th a t we calcu lated  there involves in troducing a donkey for every 
fa rm er in the  discourse universe if they all own donkeys. (O therwise, the  em pty 
in form ation  s ta te  is re tu rned .) U pdating w ith (25) cannot introduce new farm ers, 
however. If all farmers in th e  input inform ation s ta te  have donkeys, then  in tro­
duc ing  new ones would be a  non-minimal modification; if some do not, then  the 
em p ty  inform ation would be re tu rned , anyway.
The fact th a t most dynam ic semantic theories tre a t sentences like (25) as 
‘ex ternally  s ta tic ’ (i.e., not giving rise to new discourse referents) stem s from  the 
observation th a t such a sentence cannot be continued w ith  it (as referring to a 
donkey). We believe this is a  non sequitur: a sentence like (25) is pragm atically  
in ad eq u a te  w hen talking ab o u t ju s t one farm er (w ith ju s t one donkey), so no single 
donkey is available in its o u tp u t inform ation state. Several donkeys m ust be there,
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which makes it inappropriate, but they is fine (except th a t it is ambiguous between 
‘the farm ers’ and ‘the donkeys’).
Another im portan t concept of dynamic theories of semantics is distributiv- 
ity. A formula is said distributive if and only if updating  an inform ation state  
w ith it consists in updating  each possibility separately. A language in terpreted  
dynamically is said distributive if all of its formulae are distributive. As shown by 
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990), a logic tha t is both distributive and  eliminative 
is not really dynamic. B ut their result does not apply to our theory, because DU­
PLO updates do not ‘d is tribu te ’ down to the model fragments (except for atomic 
formulae).
(28) Fact: Distributivity in DUPLO
= U peÄ ( M ) -
T h a t is, the process of updating  an information state  is distributive in the  sense 
th a t we get the same result if we update  the singleton information sta tes  containing 
each possibility one by one, then  take the union of the results.
As we m entioned earlier, the distributivity of the possibility opera to r is harm ­
less in DUPLO. In particu lar, the argum ent in Groenendijk et a1. (1994) why 
possibility should be non-distributive does not apply to our treatm ent:
(29) I f  someone is hiding in the closet, then he might have done it.
The in terpretation  th a t bo th  Groenendijk et ai. (1994) and DUPLO predict for 
this sentence and the DUPLO definitions yield is ‘there must be a t least one 
individual among those who might be hiding in the closet who m ight have done 
i t ’. As for the DUPLO trea tm ent of (29), updating an information s ta te  w ith its 
«/-clause yields one in which every possibility will contain everyone who may be 
hiding in the closet, so looking at possibilities one by one to assess the  tru th  of 
the then-clause yields the correct result.
On the other hand, D U PLO ’s interpretation of the necessity opera to r is quite 
different from th a t of U pdate Semantics. In Update Semantics, a  form ula like □  </? 
(i.e., may have no updating  effect (it yields either the inpu t inform ation
state, if <p is true  in ir, or else the em pty information state). In D U PLO , on the 
o ther hand, updating  n w ith □  yields an extension of n in which is true in a 
stable way:
(30) Fact: Update effect of □</?
1. [ C M i M
2. [-’❖ - y l i M [1, by def.]
3. U ,€ ,M A X ,.C r([« -* > )i({ p '} )= 0 ) [2, (16iii)J
4. U p6»M A X p.Cp( M i ( { p '} )  =  0) [3, (14vi)]
5. U p€,M A X p.c p(A p..Cp. M i « P " » = 1) [4, (15)]
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T h e  asym m etry betw een possibility and necessity is not unrealistic. Consider 
the following pieces o f discourse:
(31) A man is walking in the park. Maybe he wears a blue T-shirt.
(32) A man is walking in the park. It is known that he wears a blue T-shirt.
A ssum ing that all ou r m odel fragm ents are fragm ents of a model in which two men 
exist altogether, exactly  one of which wears a blue T -sh irt, the piece of discourse 
in (31) says nothing a b o u t who is walking in the park  (if we s ta rt from a m inim ally 
inform ative inform ation s ta te ).4 It could be either m an, so bo th  possibilities will 
be p resen t in the o u tp u t inform ation state. The piece of discourse in (32), on the 
o ther han d , seems to  exclude the possibility th a t the  m an walking in the park 
is not wearing a blue T -sh irt. U nder U pdate Sem antics’ definition of negation, 
the piece of discourse in  (32) should be a contradiction. Since we s ta r t from  a 
m inim ally informative inform ation s ta te , nothing is known about the  m an after 
processing a first sentence, and the second sentence would claim th a t som ething is 
known abou t him. U n d er D U PLO ’s view, however, if com m unicating ‘Ov5’ is to 
com m unicate ‘it is know n th a t <p is tru e  in the w orld’, so it makes sense to consider 
it synonym ous with p  (including its dynamic effects) except when p  is T-unstable.
T he  stabilizing effect of the necessity operator ‘ Q ’ can be pu t to  use in the 
tran sla tio n  of natural-language sentences. For exam ple, in m ost cases, overt nega­
tion is stab le  in n a tu ra l languages, although the negation th a t we need in ana­
phoric quantification a n d  universal quantification in general is not. U nder the 
above trea tm ent, we can  assume th a t a natu ral language sentence of the form 
It is not the case that p  is always translated  as which yields the  desired
effect. In  this way, we do  not have to introduce a separate , ‘stabilizing’ negation 
(together w ith a ‘s tab iliz ing ’ counterpart of universal quantification, and  so on). 
Similarly, a  natural-language sentence of the form There is exactly one x such that 
p  can be translated  as ‘ 03!;ry>’, because it is norm ally understood in a  stable way, 
unlike anaphoric quantification. By the  same token, if Every x is such that p  is 
not understood  as quantify ing  over the  discourse universe, bu t is in tended as an 
‘e ternal t r u th ’, its tran s la tio n  must be prefixed w ith ‘O ’.
N ote th a t double negation can be elim inated in DUPLO. As a  consequence, 
double negation does n o t m ake a form ula externally static. For exam ple, we predict 
the  following piece of d iscourse to be acceptable under norm al circum stances:
(33) I t is not the case that Joe does not have a car. I  saw it parked next to the 
entrance.
4 H ere we assume th a t  ou r inform ation about m en in the model and  who wears
a b lue T-shirt does n o t originate from previous discourse inform ation.
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It is not entirely clear w hether this is a desirable prediction. People’s judgm ents 
diverge on this piece of discourse, so it probably cannot serve as a key exam ple in 
the  assessment of theories of anaphors.
1.2.3. Partial DUPLO
For the sake of simplicity, we will not be very precise in the definition of the partia l 
version of DUPLO. The language C of partial DUPLO is the sam e as C  except 
th a t the set of logical constants contains an additional symbol, the presupposition 
operator ‘A ’, and if <p E Form, then  ‘Ac/?’ £ Form. These form ulae are the 
ultim ate sources of presupposition, i.e., undefinedness of semantic values. We use 
the symbol V  for an  undefined value rather than  a special value. The partia l 
tru th  function will be w ritten as [-]5, and the partial update function is [- |a . The 
tru th  values of A</? are as follows:
(14) vii.
[ A y > ] 9( 7r )  = d e i  {  * if ') ^  i;
otherwise.
As for the o ther clauses of the tru th  function, we will ju st specify when its 
value is undefined. W hen it does assign a tru th  value, the value is always calculated 
in the same way as th a t of the to ta l version, except th a t we have to  use the 
partia l versions of the  tru th  and the update functions in the calculations. The 
definition below a ttem p ts to express standard assumptions about presupposition 
and presupposition projection, which we will not dwell upon here, as they are 
tangential to our central concern.
(34) Definition: Partial truth function
i. The tru th  value of an atom ic formula is always defined. A tom ic formulae 
have no presuppositions.
ii.
7r )  =  *  < ^ d e f  V  A  A  M i [ * : « ] ( { p } )  =  * •
pe* f€C(P) ueUf
iii.
=  * ^ d e i b U ? r)  =  *.
[ i f  A  x j } ] g { 7r )  =  *  ^ > d e i  A  =  * = >  M s O ' )  =  * ) •
jr'en
iv.
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v.
W V’lff« ) =  * ^ d e f  M 9(7t) =  * V ( M U tt) ^  * & [ll>]g(lp]g(7r)) =  *).
vi.
[ < M 3 ( tt) =  * <S>def M 3 ( tt) =  *.
The p a rtia l update  function is undefined for a formula ip in an inform ation 
s ta te  7r if the least inform ative extension of 7r in which <p is true  cannot be calcu­
la te d  because of presupposition  failure. In m ost cases, this m eans th a t the tru th  
value  of <p m ust be defined in 7r in order for [ ^ I ^ tt) to be defined. T here are 
on ly  two exceptions from th is rule, namely, conjunction and m aterial im plication, 
b ecause  their tru th  in the extensions of 7r depends on n indirectly: an in term ediate  
inform ation  s ta te  is involved. B ut, in the case of m aterial im plication, the unde­
finedness of the  up d a te  function coincides w ith th a t of the tru th  function as in the 
case  of most o th e r types of form ula, because determ ining its tru th  involves u p d a t­
ing  the  inform ation sta te  w ith  the antecedent. Therefore, we have the following 
definition:
(35) Definition: Partial update function
If 7T is an  inform ation s ta te , <p is a form ula and g is an assignm ent function, 
then the  result of updating n w ith ip under g , w ritten  ‘I<r,]s (7r) \  is defined 
as follows.
(i) If ip is of the form  xp A £, then
M U 70  =  * ^ d e f  W 3(7r) =  * V ( M 9( tt) #  * & Uig( W j ( ’r)) =  *);
(ii) O therwise,
M U * -) =  * <^def r) =  *;
(iii) If I ^ l 3(7r) 7^  then
M M  =<w U  m ax , .cp(M s({p '}) = l).
pG?r
All the facts about the to ta l version of DUPLO are valid in the p a rtia l version, 
excep t tha t the proviso ‘w hen defined’ is necessary in many cases (such as the 
defin ition  of entailm ent). This does not affect the im portan t logical properties of 
D U P L O , though.
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2. Anaphors in DUPLO
Obviously, we have introduced bo th  unstable quantification and presuppositions 
in order to deal w ith anaphors (although they may be put to use for different 
purposes as well). In term s of w hat we have anticipated in the earlier sections, the 
translation of a sentence like (1) will be as follows:
(1 ') Joe has a cat. It is black.
‘3x(cat(x) A owns(j, x)) A
A (3!y(nonhum an(y))) A Vz(nonhuman(z) —■> black(z))’
It is easy to see th a t the translation of the second sentence can be produced in a 
compositional m anner. In general, if the descriptive content of an anaphor is A, 
then  its translation  is
(36) Translation o f anaphors 
A P(A (3!x(,4(x))) A Vy(.4(y) -» P (y ))).5
Accordingly, we will use ‘heM, ‘i t '5 etc. as the translations of anaphors w ith the 
descriptive contents ‘m ale’, ‘non-hum an’ etc. below.
This trea tm ent accounts for one of the most obvious characteristics of ana­
phors, nam ely th a t, in most constructs, the antecedent can be present in  the initial 
inform ation state  even if the anaphor is deeply embedded:
(37) a. Mary does not know him.
b. Mary would know it.
c. I f  she was there, she would know it.
In (37a), the anaphor is w ithin a negative predicate, in (37b), w ith in  a  m odal 
predicate, and in (37c), in the consequent of a (counterfactual) conditional. Yet 
in all three cases the antecedent is required to be present in the in itia l inform ation 
state. The presuppositional treatm ent of anaphors ensures th a t th e  anaphoric 
quantifier will have ‘wide scope’ in the translations of the sentences in  (37) w ithout 
relying on wildly non-compositional devices.
5 As a m atte r of course, this translation does not apply to so-called ‘lazy p ro ­
nouns’, which do not s tand  for their antecedents but an analogous entity, as 
in
The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the one 
who gave it to his mistress.
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On th e  other hand , th e  antecedent does not have to be present in the initial 
inform ation state, so we cannot say th a t the anaphoric quantifier always has a 
‘wide scope’:
(38) I f  she had, a car, she would lend it to me.
In  this sentence, the an tecedent of the anaphoric pronoun it is w ith in  the condi­
tional; it is difficult to im agine a compositional m echanism  th a t would assign ‘wide 
scope’ to  the  anaphoric quantifier in (37c), but ‘narrow  scope’ to th a t in (38). The 
presuppositional trea tm en t of anaphoric quantification, on the o ther hand, deals 
w ith  bo th  ‘wide-scope’ a n d  ‘narrow-scope’ cases. In term s of the definedness con­
ditions of the  update function , the presuppositions of formulae m ust be satisfied in 
th e  in itial inform ation s ta te  as a rule. Formulae of the  forms lip A ip' and ‘9? —> i f  
are  exceptional: the presuppositions of ip must be satisfied by [v7] 3(7r)- T h a t is, 
th e  presuppositions of th e  second m ember of a conjunction or a conditional are to 
be  satisfied in an inform ation  state  th a t their first m em ber yields. This is essen­
tially  the sam e behaviour of ‘presupposition projection’ th a t has been proposed by 
K a rttu n e n  (1973, 1974) a n d  K arttunen  and Peters (1979), except for some m arked 
cases, which are to be d ea lt w ith in special ways (cf. K álm án (1994)).
Ju st th e  same as th e  choice of the variables corresponding to anaphors is done 
by magic in  DPL, we also need magic for those conditions in the translations of 
anaphors th a t result from  factors external to semantics. For example, consider the 
following translation:
(2) Joe likes him.
‘A (3!x(m ale(;r) A x  7^  j ) )  A Vy((male(x) A x 7^  j )  —> likes(y, x ) ) ,
H ere it is no t clear how th e  condition ‘x 7í j '  gets into the translation  of him. 
I t is allegedly a condition th a t can be produced by syntactic inform ation (since 
Joe c-com m ands him , th ey  cannot be co-referential). If we did not include this 
condition on  the antecedent, the sentence could only m ean ‘Joe likes him self’.
Obviously, the p roperties of dynamic logics such as DPL which are related to 
th e  bound-variable view of anaphors do not hold for DUPLO. In particu lar, the 
so-called donkey equivalences of DPL,
3x(<p) Aip = 3x(p  A ip);
(3x(y>)) —> ip =  \/x(ip —> ip)
do  not hold in DUPLO. ( ‘9? =  ip’ means tha t bo th  [-]3 and [•]<, yield identical 
values for ip and  ip.) We have argued against the first of these in the  previous 
sections. We will show now  th a t the second equivalence is also not necessary for 
dealing w ith  the  relevant facts.
The use of anaphors in  conditional sentences is an age-long problem. Consider:
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(39) I f  a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
As can be seen, anaphors in the consequent of a conditional may refer to en tities 
introduced in the antecedent. Moreover, these anaphors are in the singular (a t 
least in English), which suggests th a t the conditional is a case-by-case s ta tem en t 
about the entities th a t the antecedent introduces. According to a proposal in H eim  
(1990), this phenom enon may be due to the fact th a t conditional sentences involve 
a (usually implicit) quantification over ‘cases’ or ‘situations’, which are selected 
by the antecedent. For example, (39) should be interpreted as ‘in each s itu a tio n  
in which a farm er owns a donkey, th a t farmer beats th a t donkey’.
The machinery of DUPLO as introduced above offers a n a tu ra l way of c ap ­
turing the concept of ‘cases’ or ‘situations’. Each ‘case’ or ‘s itua tion ’ can be seen 
as a possibility in the inform ation state. Updating an inform ation state  w ith  th e  
antecedent of a conditional sentence yields just those ‘m inim al situations’ th a t  
Heim (1990) m entions.6
As for the anaphors in the consequent of (39), the possibilities th a t u p d a tin g  
w ith the antecedent yields are the ‘biggest’ (i.e., least inform ative) among those  
in which ‘a  farm er owns a donkey’. Therefore, their discourse universes (i.e., th e  
universes of their core elements) will be minimally larger than  those in the in p u t 
information state, i.e., they will contain just one farm er and one donkey.7 T h a t is 
why the translations th a t we proposed for he and it are appropriate  in this case:
(39') I f  a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
3x(F (x)  A 3yD (x ,y))  —* beats(he', it')
(40) Fact: Truth of (39')
1. [3x(F(a:) A 3yD (x ,y ))  —» beats(he', it, )]s (7r) =  1
2. [beats(he', it')]ff([3x(E (x) A 3yD(x, y ) ) ] ,^ ) )  =  1 [1, (14v)]
3. [beats(he',it')]fl(Up€^  MAXp,cP(A/6c(P ') Vu , u ' £ l / f
[F (x) A D (x, y)]j7[x:u][3/:u,] ({ lp '/} ) =  1)) =  1 [2, (15)]
6 As a m atter of fact, it yields the minimal extensions of the  input s ta te  s a t­
isfying the antecedent. We are aware of the fact th a t not every conditional 
sentence is to be in terpreted  in this way. For example, the antecedent of a 
counterfactual selects m inim al situations th a t are not even com patible w ith  
the input inform ation state. We believe th a t even norm al conditional sen­
tences could be treated  in this way. T hat is, in th a t case, the an tecedent 
could yield ‘sub-situations’ of the input situations, i.e., minimal m odifications 
possibly different from its extensions.
7 Unless the input inform ation state  already contains farmers and donkeys; see 
below.
22 2. Anaphors in DUPLO
Since th e  possibilities selected by the  antecedent will contain all possible 
farm er/donkey  pairs, we get the in te rp re ta tion  th a t D PL yields if we translate  
sentences like (39) as above. The translation  of (39) is tru e  if and only if, in every 
possibility th a t  arises from  the input s ta te  by introducing a  farm er and a donkey 
he owns, th e  farm er will beat the donkey. W hether all conditional sentences in 
n a tu ra l language are to be translated in th is way is arguable. In fact, the uniform  
‘double-universal’ readings th a t D PL’s ‘donkey equivalences’ predict have been 
largely questioned in the  literature. M aybe the ‘double-universal’ reading th a t 
th e  above tran sla tio n  yields is peculiar for such atem poral sentences, and other 
universal sentences have different translations.
There is an  interesting problem th a t th is  analysis raises. If the initial inform a­
tio n  state in  which (39) is u tte red  already contains m ore th an  one farm er an d /o r 
donkey, then  th e  biggest sub-possibilites th a t  satisfy ‘a farm er owns a  donkey’ also 
contain several of them . In  th a t case, we predict he a n d /o r  it in the antecedent 
to  be infelicitous. This prediction may sound odd, bu t —  at least in principle — 
th e  anaphoric pronouns he an d /o r it cannot in fact be used felicitously if there 
a re  several possible antecedents in the context. The peculiarity of th is prediction 
in  the case of (39) may be due to rhetorical reasons. B ut this problem  would 
n o t even arise if we adopted the strategy described in footnote 6. This possibility 
opens directions for fu rther research.
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